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Jefferson against
Madison's war.

By a true Republi-
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JEFFERSON

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MADISON'S WAR,

BEING AN EXHIBITION OF THE LATE PRESIDENT JEFFERSON'S
OPINION OF THE IMPOLICY, AND FOLLY OF ALL WARS,
ESPECIALLY FOR THE UNITED STATES, TOGETHER
WITH SOME REMARKS ON THE PRESENT
WAR, AND THE PROPRIETY OF CHOOS-
ING ELECTORS WHO WILL VOTE

FOR A

PEACE PRESIDENT.



BY A

TRUE REPUBLICAN.



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NEW YORK

TO THE OLD REPUBLICANS OF MASSACHUSETTS
AND THE FORMER SUPPORTERS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON.

MY BRETHREN,

No man despises more heartily than I do, a turncoat, an unsteady, changing, unprincipled man. I respect men the more for their steady adherence to their party, and their political opinions, provided they have been formed after due deliberation, and are given up as soon as they are convinced that they are erroneous.—But though this principle of a constant and resolute adherence to one's political opinions be certainly honourable and generally safe, yet we ought to be especially on our guard lest we confound this useful rule with an adherence to *particular men*, who may and often do deceive us. “Measures and not men”—“a government of laws and not of men”—are two of the oldest, and though the most familiar, not the least important of our republican maxims. Men may change, principles cannot. Power may make men forget *right*, as Mr. Jefferson used to say ; but right itself, and wrong, never vary.

Of all the men whose principles have attached the republicans to them, Mr. Jefferson certainly stood the highest, and Mr. Madison owes all his reputation with us, to the belief that the mantle of the former, like that of the prophet Elijah, had descended upon him.

If, therefore, my fellow-republicans, I can shew you, that Mr. Madison has departed from all the old and excellent and prudent maxims which endeared Mr. Jefferson to the republican party ; that he has gone directly counter to all the measures which Jefferson pursued, and the principles which he and you have ever maintained ; why I trust, that you will with me prefer to stand by your *principles*, rather than the man *who violates* them, and you will see, if you cannot select

some other other republican who will go back to the old republican ground from which Mr. Madison has strayed.

I shall now proceed to shew a great number of principles, which were considered by Mr. Jefferson and us, as the very foundation, as the solid underpinning of republicanism, and from which the present policy of administration has swerved.

I shall begin with the corner-stone of the whole edifice, the necessity of *peace* to this republic—the fatal effects of all *wars* to the United States. I need not say to you, because it must be fresh in your minds, that it was President Adams's departure from this sound and correct principle, which lost him his office, and the confidence of the people, and it was Mr. Jefferson's love of *peace* which first brought him into the chair.

The truth is, wars are fatal to a young, growing, agricultural, and commercial nation—they are still more fatal to a republican one. I shall not, however, go into the argument in proof of it in this place, because I shall now give you the admirable opinions of Thomas Jefferson on that subject—arguments and opinions which you see he applies, not alone to the *time* in which he wrote, during President Adams's administration, but to all *future* as well as past times—Not to one country only, but to all countries—not to the French war into which John Adams with fury and rage was then plunging us, but to all future wars. The truth of his doctrines, like all truth, is immutable. It must be as correct now as it was *then*. And if Mr. Madison has been so misguided or misdirected as to forget this sacred truth, so dear to the hearts of republicans, I hope they will not be so inconstant to their principles, as to follow him wilfully into so fatal an error. If they do, they will lose their standing, and federalism will again triumph over prostrate republicanism.

The opinions of Mr. Jefferson, of which I speak, will be found in the 4th volume of the Philosophical Transactions of the Society of which Mr. Jefferson is now President, in a letter from him to Sir John Sinclair,

dated Philadelphia, March 23d 1798, and which I shall print at large for your edification, and conviction of the folly and impolicy of the *present war*.

Mr. Jefferson's Letter to Sir John Sinclair.

“ I am fixed in awe at the mighty conflict to which
 “ two great nations are advancing, and recoil with *hor-*
 “ *ror* at the ferociousness of man. Will nations never
 “ devise a more rational umpire of difference than
 “ *force*? Are there no means of coercing injustice
 “ more gratifying to our nature than the waste of the
 “ blood of thousands, and the labour of millions of our
 “ fellow men? We see numerous societies of men,
 “ (the aborigines of this country) (our red brethren)
 “ living together without laws or magistracy. Yet
 “ they live in peace among themselves, and acts of vi-
 “ olence and injury are as rare as in nations which
 “ keep the sword of law in perpetual activity.

“ Public reproach and refusal of common offices,
 “ interdiction of commerce and comforts of society,
 “ are found as effectual as the coarser means of force.—
 “ Nations, like individuals, stand towards each other
 “ only in the relations of natural right. Might they
 “ not like them be peaceably punished for violence and
 “ wrong? Wonderful has been the progress of hu-
 “ man improvement in other times. Let us hope then
 “ that the law of nature which makes virtuous conduct
 “ produce benefit; vice, loss to the agent in the long
 “ run; which has sanctioned the common maxim,
 “ that honesty is the best policy, will in time influence
 “ the proceedings of nations, as well as of individuals;
 “ that we shall at length be sensible, that *war is an in-*
 “ *strument* entirely *INEFFICIENT* towards *redressing*
 “ *wrongs*, and that it *multiplies* instead of *indemnifying*
 “ *losses*. Had the money spent in the present war
 “ (between Great Britain and France) been employed
 “ in making roads and cutting canals, not a hovel in
 “ the remotest corner of the highlands of Scotland,
 “ or mountains of Auvergne would have been with-
 “ out a boat at its door, or a rill of water in its field,

"and a road to the market town. Had the money we
 " (Americans) have lost by the depredations of all na-
 " tions been employed in the same way, what commu-
 " nications would have been opened to us of roads and
 " waters.

" Yet, were we to go to war for redress, instead of
 " redress, we should *plunge deeper into loss*, and dis-
 " able ourselves for *half a century more* from attaining
 " the same end. " A war would cost us more than
 " would cut through the Isthmus of Darien. These
 " truths are palpable, and must in the progress of time
 " influence the minds of men, and the conduct of na-
 " tions."

Signed, THOS. JEFFERSON.

End of Jefferson's letter.

Yes! these truths are palpable, and they ought to influence our conduct now. This great man did not confine his ideas to Adams's war in 1798, but he looked forward and hoped the day would arrive, when they would have their operation in our country. He did not speak for that case, for he knew Mr. Adams's war spirit could not be restrained, but he gave his advice to republicans whenever *they* should come into power. *We* are now in power; we are likely so to continue;—shall we not apply Mr. Jefferson's sound and excellent advice? Shall we prefer a man, who, like Mr. Madison, chooses war with its "half a century of evils," a war which will multiply, instead of diminishing our losses, "to another republican, who is opposed to war, and who believes with Mr. Jefferson that war is "an instrument entirely inefficient towards redressing wrongs?"

The second fundamental doctrine of republicans, was, that the militia are the natural bulwark of a free country, and that standing armies are an expensive, anti-republican, dangerous engine. When President Adams raised an army of only ten thousand men, he disgusted and disaffected all the republican party. We then thought them a tax upon the industrious part of the community—a refuge and reward for those who were too idle to work, and too proud to labour.

M. Madison, as if he despised that voice, that warning voice, which made itself so audibly heard in the sudden disgrace and downfall of Mr. Adams, has not only agreed to fill up the old standing army amounting to ten thousand men, but has agreed to add a new permanent standing force of twenty-five thousand more. Thus this free republick; so remote from the collisions and contests of the old world, finds itself saddled with a greater military force than Great Britain maintained in the reign of Queen Anne, only one century ago. This measure is in direct opposition to the *principles* upon which Mr. Madison was originally supported, and to the laudable *practice* of Mr. Jefferson, who, during his eight years presidency, actually reduced, instead of increasing the standing troops. I shall quit this branch of the subject by simply stating the annual expence of the force now ordered to be raised. If we could maintain our troops as cheap as they do in France, the annual expence would be about 7 millions of dollars, and that of the volunteers, whom the President is ordered to accept, would be 10 millions more. But as the pay, provisions, and other munitions of war are nearly double in this country what they are in France, Mr. Gallatin, our Secretary of the Treasury, has very moderately calculated the annual expenses of the war at *thirty millions of dollars*. The proportion which will fall upon the State of Massachusetts, according to the federal constitution, will be three millions of dollars. In order that my republican brethren may judge of the enormous weight of this debt I will only add, that our annual State tax amounts to 150,000 dollars.

Thus one year's war taxes upon this State must amount to just twenty years taxes, assessed by our own immediate government.

Now we may with great propriety in this place notice the force and justice of Mr. Jefferson's remark; that "if we go to war to redress our wrongs by the depredations of belligerents we shall plunge deeper into loss."

Apply his prudent and excellent principle to the present case. The avowed cause of war for the redress of which we were plunged into our present calamities, was the interdiction of our trade to France, by Great Britain; we shall pass over to another place the consideration that Great Britain has since removed this restriction, and that our trade to France would be now free; we shall simply compare in this place, the amount of the evils we sustained by the British orders, with the expence and injury of the mode of redress.

The whole exports of Massachusetts to all the countries from which the British orders excluded us, never amounted to three millions of dollars, and the greater part of what we did export thither were of articles which were the growth of the West Indies. France never took any of the productions of Massachusetts except a small portion of our fish.

By the war, we lose not only all our lumber, beef and pork trade, and all our commerce in potashes, but also the employment of more than one thousand ships which were engaged in the trade with Great Britain and her colonies.

So that the annual expence of the war to this State alone, not only exceeds all its exports to France, for the benefit of which the war is undertaken, but we lose all the trade to Great Britain, all the freights made by our ships in that trade, and all the profit earned by the thousands of men who were before employed in fitting out those ships, in navigating them, and in raising and furnishing their cargoes.

It would not be too much to say, that our losses every year are more than four times the value of the object for which the contest was undertaken.

But this is not all—say, it is not one hundredth part of our losses. What does Mr. Jefferson mean, in his letter to Sir John Sinclair, when he says, that “by a war we should sacrifice ourselves *half a century* from attaining the same end”? I will tell you what he means.

The direct loss in exports, freights, labour and profits, is but a trifle compared to the other losses occu-

sioned by war. The very intelligent and comprehensive mind of Mr. Jefferson took in distant consequences, as well as immediate effects.

He included in this *half a century of injuries*, the actual and dreadful loss of capital by captures—the diversion of the accustomed trade of other countries, which we had been habituated to supply, into other channels, and which we may never again regain—the loss in that part of our capital invested in stores and wharves, and in dwelling-houses for our merchants, who will be obliged to quit our towns—the change of the habits of our young men, who will be forced from employments profitable to the state, to the useless, expensive, dangerous and unprofitable occupation of arms—the suspension of the labour and accustomed occupations of one half million of men, employed in collecting lumber, taking and curing fish, making potashes, raising, killing and preparing beef and pork, and the thousand arts connected with ship building and navigation. Hence it was, that our republican father, Washington, and our republican friend, Jefferson, thought that *WARS* in our infant and feeble state would be so *permanently* injurious to this young, but enterprising and growing country.

The third maxim of republicans, which induced us to change Mr. Adams's administration for Mr. Jefferson's, was, that in a young and free country, the taxes should be as light as possible, and all those expensive and odious modes of taxation should be avoided, which have a tendency to multiply the number of officers, and to harass and vex the people in their ordinary concerns.

The stamp act laid by Great-Britain convulsed our country to its centre. The excises raised a rebellion among the republicans of Pennsylvania, and the land tax was deservedly odious throughout the United States.

Accordingly Mr. Jefferson, in compliance with the wishes of the republicans, recommended the repeal of all these odious taxes, and they were repealed.

But this dreadful and unnecessary war has driven Mr. Madison to such straits, that he has been compel-

led to resort to every one of the *offensive taxes* of the *Federalists*. Congress have adopted the plan, and the execution of it is suspended only to the next session. The next Spring will bring us an *army* of land tax assessors and collectors, of excise officers, of stamp duty agents. Not a cottage will be free from visitation! not a comfort or necessary of life from imposition!—While foreign goods are immensely enhanced in price by the war and double duties, even some of the few domestic manufactures, which contribute to our comfort, are to be saddled with heavy burdens.

If a man had risen from the dead in the beginning of Mr. Jefferson's administration, and had assured us, while that patriot was providing the means of protecting us from those exactions which "took from the mouth of labour its reward," that in *twelve short years* that pittance would be wrested from the poor by a republican successor, we should have called the prophet a madman. Yet such things have Mr. Madison's friends in Congress actually proposed and passed by resolutions.

The fourth maxim of republicans, and one to which they were exceedingly attached, was, the necessity of rotation, frequent rotation in office. This excellent principle was founded upon these considerations: that men long continued in power are apt to forget the feelings and interests of their constituents—that the receipt of large salaries and the permanent exercise of vast powers have a tendency to harden the mind of the ruler, and to make him forget the sufferings, and real condition of the people. How indeed can a President, surrounded with luxuries, enjoying a salary of twenty-five thousand dollars a year, realize the sufferings of the poor sailor, deprived of his bread; of the laborious lumber cutter or lumber merchant, thrown out of employ; of the industrious manufacturers of salt, reduced to beggary, by the refusal of government to protect them; of the enterprising whaler and fisherman, starving for want of employment? To a President like Mr. Madison, who never makes the circuit amidst the scenes of distress which the war occasions; who knows

no other effects of it but his increased patronage from the number of officers created by the vast standing army, and by the losses occasioned in that army by death and capture; to such a President, who is sure to receive his twenty-five thousand dollars, if there is as much left in the treasury, or if so much can be borrowed or forced from the poor citizen by taxes, a war is a mighty pretty sort of thing. It increases his power. It is a sort of game, at which he can play with as much coolness as he would at a game of checquers or chess. But he knows nothing of the sufferings of the citizens. Their complaints hardly ever reach his palace, and if they are wafted thither from a distance, they are overpowered by the adulations and clamours of those who surround him, seeking for offices and salaries and epaulets, for all which the suffering people are to pay.

It was on this account that the republicans always thought, that it was important, that the President should, at stated times, return to private life, and be succeeded by a *new* man, who, going from the *midst of the people*, should carry with him a knowledge of and a feeling for their sufferings. The provision of the constitution is a dead-letter, if a man can be continued for life.

But there is another species of rotation not provided for by the constitution, but which is of infinite importance.

I mean a rotation of political power between the several States. The United States are composed of many distinct sovereignties, which although in some points they have a common interest, yet a man must be blind who does not perceive, that they have also distinct and separate interests. Virginia raises tobacco and flour; she owns but little shipping comparatively. A state of things may exist which may be ruinous to New-York and Massachusetts, and yet highly beneficial to Virginia. Such a state of things now exists. Virginia is growing rich by the war. Her flour is all exported at immense and unheard of prices. But the Northern States can export little or nothing; and what with the failure of their crops, and the enhanced price

of Virginia flour, and foreign produce, they are crushed under the effects of the war.

Far be it from me; far be it from any honest republican to cultivate a jealousy between the several states. Our political opponents have carried this point to improper lengths, and I fear that some of them have even gone so far as almost to wish a separation. I abhor this idea. But while we would discountenance such jealousies between the several States, we ought not to be so mean, so abject, so lost to our own interests, as not to wish to have the voice of the Northern States heard *once in a century*. I say *once in a century*, at Washington. This is but a *moderate wish*.

Now let us see how stands the fact? Out of the twenty-four years that the federal constitution has existed, Virginia has had a President twenty years!!

It is impossible for the best man not to have some prejudice in favour of his own State; even if he had no prejudices, he knows the interest of his own State best, and he must be comparatively ignorant of the state of *other parts* of the country. For example, Madison knew the war would not injure Virginia, because Britain wanted her flour, and she would easily get it, because the Virginians, with all their pretended patriotism, would sell it to her.

But Mr. Madison did *not* know the number of the persons dependent on the whale-fishery; he did *not* know the extent of the salt-works at Cape Cod; he did *not* know how many men would starve if the lumber trade and ship-building of Maine should be annihilated; or if he did know these facts he went rashly into the war.

Hence the war appeared to him a *light matter*, while it was *death to us*.

It is then proper and expedient that once in twenty or thirty years we should have a President who has a *feeling for us*. Such a man is Mr. Clinton: a firm republican, but who being a citizen of a northern and commercial state, and a Mayor of a great trading city, knows well the interests, must carry into office

with him a sympathy, and must feel a disposition to relieve the distresses of the Commercial States.

Is this doctrine unfair? Does this look like jealousy? Does this tend to *disunion*? *What* do we humbly ask for? Why, that *once* in twenty years, the great State of New-York, whose interests are the same with New-England, a state possessing one million of souls (and together with New-England, holding more than two millions) should have the privilege of a ruler who knows and feels for its interest.

These are true republican doctrines. They are the means of preserving, not of destroying the union; the way to destroy the union is to suffer these jealousies to grow until they become too formidable for resistance, which may be the case if Virginian interests and politicks are suffered forever to prevail.

Having stated the several republican principles which have been of late strangely perverted or overlooked, I shall now proceed to make some remarks on the present war, for which, having been suddenly and unexpectedly recommended by Mr. Madison, he must be considered as responsible; and if, from a view of the whole matter, my republican friends shall agree with me, that it was prematurely commenced, and is unskilfully and improperly prosecuted, they will have no hesitation in preferring *another republican*, who will either put an end to it, or who will prosecute it with more ability and honour.

I do not mean to say that we had not ample cause of war against Great Britain. God forbid, that I should extenuate my country's wrongs.

But I do say,

First, that I agree with Mr. Jefferson, that war is a very inefficient mode of redressing our wrongs.

2ndly, That these wrongs could have been much better redressed by negotiation.

3dly, That the war was commenced without due preparation.

thly, That it has been unsuccessfully, and I think very unskillfully managed.

Lastly, That the great and principal cause of it has been since removed, and yet Mr. Madison does not make peace.

I shall say but a few words on each, because a few words are sufficient on points so close. I have stated no points which I cannot prove.

1st, Then I say war is an "inefficient mode of redressing our wrongs." This I borrow from Mr. Jefferson. I support it thus: The honour of nations is not exactly like that of individuals; an individual, may, though not always with prudence, attempt to revenge his wrongs when success is very uncertain. It would, however, in an individual be esteemed ridiculous, if he should go to China to chastise a Mandarin who had insulted his son, or in fact attempt any other impracticable thing. But the *wisest and the proudest* nations often overlook, or forego, or suspend their revenge, until they can see a reasonable prospect of success.

Especially in case of mere pecuniary injuries, such as were inflicted by the British orders in council, which were not designed, nor were they in effect, any *more* upon our *honour*, but a mere *pecuniary loss*. Nations might, and the greatest and most powerful nations do, frequently count the cost before they go to war. Now I have already shewn, that the cost of this war for one year only will exceed all the injury we ever sustained by the orders in council.

Again, war is an "inefficient mode of obtaining redress," because we have no navy which can cope with Great Britain. She is only accessible by us in Canada, and through her trade. As to the latter she can destroy ours completely; we can only injure and impair hers; we cannot destroy it. Now in all combats, the question is not whether both can do each other some injury, but it is, as Mr. Jefferson said, which can "do the other the most harm?"

If a weak man is contending with a strong one, it is very little satisfaction to him that he can give his ad-

versary a blow on the eye, if, at the return blow, his adversary can knock his brains out.

So as to Canada, suppose we get it at the expence of ten thousand men ; and we have already lost three thousand five hundred without gaining an inch of ground, and with the further loss of twenty millions of dollars ; how stands the account ? Why Britain has lost what she did not want, we shall have gained what we *cannot keep*, and what we do not desire, and what Britain would have sold us for half the money.

Now at the end of the campaign, or of the several campaigns, when we shall have waded through our own blood, and over our own bags of gold to Canada, which will be most weakened, we or Great Britain ?

Will this conquer the freedom of the seas ? Will this compel her to yield her maritime superiority ? As well might you expect a brave man to yield to his adversary, because he had knocked off his hat.

But secondly, Our wrongs could have been better adjusted by negotiation. I have but two words to say on this point. I have shown under the last head, that they could not have been *worse* adjusted than by *war*.

I have only to add two things. First, that they must finally be settled by negotiation. All wars, however violent, end in that ; of course negotiation *without* suffering would have been better than negotiation *after* such immense losses, unless we expect to be successful in humbling Great Britain, which I have shown we shall probably not be.

2ndly, That even without negotiation Great Britain has yielded the great point, and no doubt negotiation would soon have settled the rest.

3dly, We say that the war was commenced without due preparation. This is chargeable to Mr. Madison, and to him only ; Congress are not responsible for that ; it was a pure executive duty. Need I prove this assertion, that we were unprepared ? Where were the 35000 men who were to carry Canada at a stroke ? Not 5000 of them yet raised. Where were the 50,000 volunteers ? Not 2000 yet in service.

Why was Governor Strong ordered to turn out the militia? Because, said Mr. Madison, we have *no men* for the forts.

Why was Hull sent in with an army which in thirty days after the war, the British commander was able to take?

Why has General Dearborn suffered the whole campaign to pass inactive, and to permit Great Britain to send troops from England, the West Indies, and Halifax, so that four times the force is now necessary to take Canada, as at the declaration of war?

Why were 5 of our frigates totally unfit for service?

These and a thousand, may ten thousand other proofs may be adduced of the total want of preparation.

If suspicion could be harboured in the generous hearts of republicans, we should almost be disposed to say, that all this looks like connivance with the enemy, and that every other thing was intended, rather than a serious attack upon her. Certainly if she had directed, or influenced our councils, she could not have made them more favourable to herself.

4thly, The war has been unsuccessfully, and unskillfully managed.

The publick shame and disgrace of our arms I will not, I should blush to repeat. The whole revolutionary war of eight years cannot shew such a succession of disasters.

The loss of one army of 2500 men, and the sacrifice of 1600 more under Col. Renauld, speak a language too distressing, too humiliating not to be heard and lamented.

But is Mr. Madison accountable for these disasters? Surely he is. Was Hull incapable? Was he cowardly? Was he treacherous? Why Madison was responsible for appointing him. But if, as is most probable, the error under Hull was incompetent, and was ill supplied, Madison, and he alone, is answerable. I was struck with the remark of an old revolutionary general, the highest in rank now alive of the officers of the last war—upon being asked whether he thought Mr. Madison the proper man to be supported at this critical time, he replied—

“If your wife and your child were dangerously sick, and your family physician appeared to be unable or incompetent to cure them, would you call in another physician, or would you let them die?”

This gentleman is a staunch republican, and at the head of one of the electoral tickets. Every man can see the application, and every prudent man will apply the remedy.

Lastly, the great and principal cause of the war has been removed.

Since the war was declared, the orders in Council have been rescinded, so that our trade, if peace was made, would now be free to every part of the globe.

We should again have the profits of an unrivalled neutrality ;—our wilderness would blossom as the rose ;—the hum of industry would be heard in our streets, and the din of arms, the horrors of carnage, and the distress of war would cease.

But Mr. Madison has refused even an *armistice*—*Unprepared* as we are for hostile attack, he is unwilling even to suspend the horrors of a disgraceful war.

How we are to interpret this conduct, so inconsistent with our best interests, so much at variance with the excellent and humane principles of Mr. Jefferson, I am unable to determine.

Having shewn the evils of war generally, its total inefficiency to attain its objects (which are a redress of our wrongs) I shall conclude by stating its *peculiar* effects on Massachusetts ; on the province of Maine ; and on the old colony.

In a great and extended country, it is impossible that the interests should be the same throughout the whole. While Virginia and the Southern States are rioting in luxury by the unexampled high price of flour which Great Britain purchases by means of licenses, and particularly by neutral flags, the unfortunate State of Massachusetts is bleeding at every pore. The whole of this disastrous war falls upon us. We have no staple produce which our enemy wants ; our ships are laid up to rot at our wharves ; our stores will soon

lie vacant and unoccupied; our seamen are deprived of employment; our merchants are forced to suspend their enterprises; our fishermen are constrained to quit their occupations, and our farmers, though they have not yet perceived, will soon feel the dreadful effects of a stagnated or rather annihilated commerce.

The District of Maine, a new and infant state, with a bold, enterprising, industrious population, depends exclusively on foreign trade for its support. Its natural commerce is with Great Britain, and her West India possessions. She has no profitable staple like that of Virginia which our enemy must consume.

Her principal sources of wealth (the export of lumber, shipbuilding and navigation) are dried up. While she will be compelled to pay her full quota of the taxes occasioned by the war, she will be left without the means of furnishing them. An end will be put to her growth. Her new settlements must either stand still or be abandoned. Without that accumulated capital which older states enjoy, she will be reduced to poverty, and the burdens of the war will be felt by her in a proportion, far beyond her strength or her ability to sustain. Even the pittance which she derives from the coasting trade, will probably be cut off as soon as the enemy shall arrive in force upon our coasts, and shall find Mr. Madison deaf to all proposals for accommodation.

Can it be possible under such circumstances, that our republican brethren in Maine will hesitate, whether they will prefer Mr. Clinton, a northern man, who will feel for the distresses of commerce, to Mr. Madison, the author of all their misfortunes? I trust not.

The old Colony too will feel the vengeance of this war, in a manner which ought to excite the most feeling emotions. With a soil not the most propitious for agriculture, their "farms are upon the ocean," and their "home upon the mountain wave."

Nantucket, exposed to the incursions of the enemy, without the means of defence or resistance, and considering also the religious principles of the friends, surely cannot hesitate between two republicans, whether they will prefer the *friend of peace and commerce* to the enemy of both.

As to the inhabitants of Barnstable, that hardy, industrious, and virtuous race of men ; they appear to be devoted to ruin. It seems as if the war, and its natural consequences, were intended for their *special* destruction.

To what resource can these honest republicans look up in this tremendous conflict ? What are the means of support left to them ?

The protecting hand of government withdrawn from their manufactories of salt ! Even the ocean from which they are now interdicted, might have afforded them some sustenance by their industry, applied to a manufacture, which all the nation wants. But even this resource is weakened ! They will, after a few years war, have nothing left to subsist on but their tears !

After having expended vast sums in edifices to supply the country with a necessary of life, even during a war which will render the encouragement of such manufactures so important, the aid of government is withdrawn, because a Virginia planter who makes them pay eleven dollars a barrel for flour, will not consent to pay ten cents a year for seasoning the luxuries on his table.

While too the protecting duty, which first gave existence and vigour to this useful manufacture, is withdrawn, the double duties on tea, and other foreign articles, which must be paid by the consumer, operate most cruelly upon these unfortunate people, who appear to be thrown out of the protection of the government. Even their complaints and remonstrances are treated with contempt, and the most unpopular and odious officers are continued, as it were, for the purpose of offending and outraging the feelings of a whole people.

Upon the whole may we not say that the interest of all the republicans of Massachusetts calls upon them strenuously to exert themselves to effect a change of rulers ; not a change of *principles*, but a change of *men*.

Ought we not to prefer a northern President in this eventful period ? a man friendly to commerce, because he is acquainted with its interests ; a man firmly attached to republican principles, uniformly supported by the republicans of his own state ; a man of vigorous

undaunted mind, equally calculated to prosecute the war with honour, if that dreadful alternative be necessary, or to conclude an honourable and advantageous peace, to which he is sincerely disposed.

Such a man is

DE WIT CLINTON.

As to his rival, Mr. Madison, we know one thing of him; he found the country at peace; he leaves it at war; he found it prosperous and happy; he leaves it embarrassed and wretched. He made war without preparation; he carries it on without skill or ability; he will leave us degraded and disgraced.

As a republican, I have no hesitation to prefer Mr. Clinton, and I am too independent to relinquish my opinions, because the federalists happen to agree with me in them.—These are no ordinary times; we are on trial for our lives; we are all embarked in the same bottom, and I am glad that the spirit of party has yielded to a sense of common danger, and a wish for common safety.

A TRUE REPUBLICAN.

N B I was pleased to see that staunch and venerable republican soldier, Gen. Heath, at the head of the Clinton Ticket. Such an office, is worthy of the friend and surviving companion of Washington. It was also perfectly in character to see old Mr. Adams on the war ticket. I shall never forget his reign of terror. "To arms my young friends, to arms," always was, and always will be, the old gentleman's cry. I dare say he expects to see the republicans ruined by the war so his party win.











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